May 6, 2025
9.00 am, Aula Marini (2nd floor, bldg B)
Essays in Public Procurement and Intermediaries’ Competition
Roberto Pezzuto
Abstract
This thesis analyses situations in which, due to informational frictions, competition is imperfect, and a subset of the economic agents involved in the interaction hold some form of market power. Specifically, the exchange protocol is auction-based, rather than the standard Walrasian market protocol. In each chapter, it investigates how certain features that coexist on top of the auction-like exchange protocol - such as debarment rules in public procurement, discrete capacity constraints, or platform business models - affect consumer surplus, the incentives of the involved parties, and ultimately the regulatory or policy implications aimed at promoting consumer welfare.
Supervisors: Eloisa Campioni, Albero Iozzi
Examiners: Daniel Cardona Coll (U. of the Balearic Islands), Dimitri Paolini (U. of Sassari), Juha Tolvanen.